The Bible ABSOLUTELY Endorses The HORRIFIC Practice of Slavery

The Bible ABSOLUTELY Endorses The HORRIFIC Practice of Slavery

It is a long way down, all along, that I know so well.

In the ancient world, gods granted kings the right to rule and to administer justice in the land. In the third millennium BCE, King Ur-Nammu left behind a list of laws created under divine authority. Later, the famous King Hammurabi of Babylon set up a similar but much larger set of laws, where he is depicted as receiving the right to rule from the sun god Shamash. Throughout the millennia, kings were bestowed with the authority to judge their people with fairness and equity, and they committed these judgments and laws to writing for us to view today.

Similarly, in the Hebrew Bible, we see lists of laws that have been passed down from generation to generation. In the books of Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, we see collections that contain regulations concerning everything from murder to theft, to returning a wandering animal. Perhaps surprisingly, included in all of these lists, from both inside and outside the Bible, are laws that endorse the practice of slavery—one human owning another human as property.

While you might not be shocked to learn that people in the ancient world thought it was acceptable to own people as property, it may have caught you off guard that the Bible contained laws endorsing the practice of slavery. The presence of laws relating to slavery in the Bible is often quite jarring to those who hold these texts as being handed down by the most high God. How could a text, either divinely inspired by God or forming the foundation for a religion that has persisted for over 2,000 years, contain laws that endorse the practice of slavery?

What was slavery like as described in the Hebrew Bible? Were there really laws that endorsed owning other people as property? If so, how do these laws compare to those from other ancient cultures in the region? If there was genuine slavery in the laws of the Old Testament, what about the New Testament? Did the New Testament condemn the social institution of slavery? Finally, how does all of this compare to the horrific and dehumanizing slavery that took place in the Antebellum South? Were the laws in the Old Testament in any way similar to the laws that were in place in America at the time?

Before we look at the specific biblical passages, it is important to define our terms. While the definition of slavery can have nuanced meanings depending on the context in which the term is used, there are essential aspects that can be seen throughout history. In what follows, we will define slavery as a condition in which an individual, or the rights to their labor, is owned by another, either temporarily or permanently. The owner controls and is legally allowed to derive benefit from the actions and activities of the owned individual.

My goal here is to give you a broad overview of slavery in the laws of the Old Testament. We will examine select portions of three primary legal sections in the Old Testament that deal with the issue of slavery: Exodus 21, Deuteronomy 15, and Leviticus 25. Following some limited commentary on these passages, we will briefly examine the common apologetic that attempts to use the New Testament to explain why God allowed slavery in the Old Testament because of man’s sinfulness.

All of this information and much more can be found in Dr. Joshua Bowen’s book, Did the Old Testament Endorse Slavery? (Second Edition). He is an Assyriologist who not only knows the Hebrew language as well as Akkadian, Sumerian, and other ancient languages, but he also sources the endless scholars who recognize this topic in depth.

Exodus 21

Let us begin with Exodus chapter 21. In verses 2 through 6, we read:

“If you buy a Hebrew slave, six years he will serve, and in the seventh he will go out free without payment. If he comes in alone, he will go out alone; if he is the husband of a wife, then his wife will go out with him. If his master gives him a wife and she bears him sons or daughters, the woman and her children belong to the master, but he will go out alone. But if the slave in fact says, ‘I love my master and my wife and my children; I will not go out free,’ then his master will bring him to God, even to the door or the doorpost, and his master will pierce his ear with an awl, and he will serve him forever.”

An Israelite buys a fellow Israelite, likely due to impoverishment, and the law sets the limit of debt service to six years. What are the rules that govern this debt-slave service? The male debt slave serves for six years and is released free of debt in the seventh. Thus, the principal, any interest, and/or additional charges would be satisfied by the six years of service. This is the basic rule concerning the male Hebrew slave.

However, there are other circumstances to be considered in this transaction. “If he comes in alone, he will go out alone; if he is the husband of a wife, then his wife will go out with him” (Exodus 21:3). This seems fairly straightforward: if the debt slave is purchased as a single man, he is to be released a single man; if he was enslaved as a married man, both he and his wife go free upon his release in the seventh year.

So far, so good. However, the situation is complicated in verse 4: “If his master gives him a wife and she bears him sons or daughters, the woman and her children belong to the master, but he will go out alone.”

The text has set forth the general principle that a Hebrew slave can only be made to serve for six years in order to pay off his debt. Now, we are dealing with a different scenario that can occur within that general principle. If he is single when he comes in, he goes out single. But what if he comes into the slave owner’s household married? In that case, he will go out married. In other words, as you came in, that is how you go out. This would also apply, therefore, to a Hebrew slave who is given a wife by his master during his term of service. Because she was the property of the master, the law required that she remain his property, along with any children that she would produce.

In other words, although the male debt slave has a set term of service, the female slave and her children are chattel slaves that remain the property of their owner. When he goes out, he goes out without them.

This stipulation in the law explains what follows in Exodus 21:5–6: “But if the slave in fact says, ‘I love my master and my wife and my children; I will not go out free,’ then his master will bring him to God, even to the door or the doorpost, and his master will pierce his ear with an awl, and he will serve him forever.”

The male debt slave is left with two options. First, he can exercise his right to release in the seventh year and go on his way. However, he would do so alone. His second option would be to remain with his wife and children, continuing to serve as a slave in the master’s home, because his wife and children are the property of the master, not subject to release after the set term of service. Remaining with his family is contingent upon him dedicating himself to lifetime service to the master. If the male debt slave decides to remain with his master, wife, and children, he swears an oath of lifelong servitude and is marked with the rest of his family as a chattel slave.

Having dealt with the rules for the male debt slave, the text turns to the female slave:

“And if a man sells his daughter as a female slave, she will not go out like the male slaves. If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master, who has designated her for himself, then he must let her be redeemed. He may not sell her to a foreign people, as he dealt treacherously with her. And if he designates her for his son, he must treat her according to the custom of daughters. If he takes another wife for himself, her food, her clothing, and her marital rights he cannot diminish. And if these three things he does not do for her, then she will go out free without payment of money” (Exodus 21:7–11).

Here, the passage speaks of a man selling his daughter as a slave in order to satisfy a debt. In this case, she is entering into a sexual relationship with either her master or his son. Given this relationship and its social and financial consequences to her value, she is to receive certain rights from her master. Her status must be changed either to a wife or a concubine, as her sexual and reproductive capacities are now in use.

This also means that, unlike the male debt slave—who was also used in a reproductive capacity but without the social and financial consequences—she is not to be released after six years. This affords her protection, as odd as that may sound, as her master must provide for her even if she falls out of favor with him. He cannot reduce her to the status of a simple slave and sell her to foreigners. He must continue to provide for her or allow her to be redeemed.

Before we leave this section of Exodus, we should briefly consider the question of the daughter’s consent in this situation. Does she agree to be sold as a female slave? The text clearly is not concerned with her opinion on the matter. Hebrew Bible scholar William Propp agrees: “In 21:7, the subject is the girl’s father, not her purchaser. In contrast, the paraphrase in Deuteronomy 15:12, ‘When your Hebrew brother or sister sells him or herself,’ empathizes more with the slave and in fact contains more liberal provisions. Exodus stresses, rather, the woman’s passivity, subject to the authority first of her father and then of her purchaser.”

Perhaps no other passage is more frequently discussed in slavery debates than Exodus 21:20–21:

“And if a man beats his male or female slave with a wooden rod so that they die immediately, he will surely be punished. However, if he survives a day or two, he will not be punished, because he is his property.”

It is unsurprising that these two verses carry so much significance in the discussion. The text describes a scenario in which either a male or female slave is beaten with a wooden rod, which sounds justifiably horrific to us. One might expect that this was the purpose of the law: “Do not beat your male or female slave with a wooden rod.” Of course, we know that this was not the law’s intent. The question is how we should understand the purpose of this regulation.

While it might seem as though the law is giving a slaveholder a type of manual on how to legally beat their slave within an inch of their lives, I do not think that this interpretation correctly understands the passage in its context. It is absolutely true that masters beat their slaves, and this passage indicates that if a master beats their slave and they survive a day or two, there is no punishment that will come to the master, as the slave is their property.

However, this law is intended to provide the slave with some level of protection from physical abuse and murder. We see in the Proverbs that “by words alone a slave cannot be corrected, since he will understand but not respond. A man who pampers the slave from youth, in the end he will be insolent” (Proverbs 29:19, 21). Beating one’s slave in the ancient Near East and in the Old Testament was certainly endorsed, as it was with beating one’s child. What we see in Exodus 21:20–21, therefore, is a law regulating the beating of one’s slave.

The rationale of the law likely focused on the intent of the master in the situation. If the master beat the slave so severely that the slave died immediately, then there would be severe punishment, likely death. However, if the slave did not die immediately but survived for a day or two, then, according to this logic, the intent of the master was likely not murderous. In other words, if the slave did not die immediately, then the benefit of the doubt would be given to the master, and the death would be seen as accidental.

In verses 26 and 27, we read:

“And if a man hits the eye of his male slave or the eye of his female slave and destroys it, he must send him out free in place of his eye. And if a tooth of his male slave or a tooth of his female slave he knocks out, he must send him out in place of his tooth.”

While it is clear that these laws are in place to benefit and protect the slave, they are often misunderstood in their context. In the preceding verses, the text is elaborating on the principle of talion, generally describing Lex Talionis or the law of retaliation. In verses 23–25, we see: “But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.”

In this context, we would expect that if a slave were on equal footing with the master before the law, we would read something akin to: “An owner who hits his male or female slave in the eye and destroys it will have his own eye destroyed.” This, of course, is not the case. The principle of retaliation—that the slave would have the right to the eye of the master—is not in play here. Thus, the slave is protected by the law, at least in theory, from abuse or excessive beatings. If they are killed as a direct result of a beating, it is considered murder and the master is likely to be killed. If the master destroys or puts out an eye or tooth, the slave is forgiven their debt and set free.

Deuteronomy 15

While we will not read through all the laws concerning slaves in Deuteronomy 15, we see many similarities between this passage and what we saw in Exodus 21. The text speaks of Hebrew slaves who serve for six years and are released in the seventh. The slave is also able to voluntarily serve for life, and a similar ritual is performed on that occasion.

There are, however, differences between these passages. The laws in Deuteronomy pertain not only to the Hebrew man but also to the Hebrew woman. In this passage, the woman is also to be released or is allowed to remain a slave for life. More significantly is the command for the master to provide a substantial amount of goods to the newly freed slave. The overall tone of the passage is one of encouraging the master not to hold back from his slave, as God has supernaturally blessed and provided for his people; he will continue to do so if they keep his covenant. In like manner, the master should also give generously to the slave. This concept of supernatural provision for obedience is seen prominently in Deuteronomy 28 and will be a central theme in the next chapter that we will analyze: the infamous Leviticus 25.

Leviticus 25

Leviticus 25 is likely familiar to most atheists and apologists who debate the issue of slavery, though probably to a very limited degree. These verses are incredibly significant to the slavery discussion; however, before we investigate what they mean, it is important to establish the context in which they exist.

Let us begin with Leviticus 25 as a whole. The beginning of the chapter contains God’s command to let the land of Israel have a year-long rest from farming every seventh year. The next section commands the people to also hold a year of rest every 50th year. They were to have seven Sabbath years, totaling 49 years, following the Jubilee in the 50th year. During this year of the Jubilee, people were to be returned to their land, and debts were to be canceled. This applied to the Israelites. Following verses 18–22, which described God’s supernatural provision if they would obey his commands, we come to the critical section of the chapter for our purposes: laws concerning Israelites that become poor.

There are three scenarios that are discussed in these verses with respect to an Israelite. In the first, because Israelites owned property in the land of Israel, if they fell into poverty, selling a portion of their land was a viable option. The law required, however, that the land would eventually return to its original owner, either by a near relative redeeming it for them or during the Year of Jubilee.

In the second scenario, it appears that the Israelite has already sold this property and still cannot make ends meet. Should this occur, the poor Israelite was to be cared for by their fellow Israelites, who were to loan them what they needed at no interest. They were to fear and obey God by supporting their poor brother, with the result that God would supernaturally provide for them because of their obedience.

In the third scenario, the Israelite actually reaches the stage where he must sell himself into debt slavery. However, they are not to be treated as slaves. In contrast to Exodus 21 and Deuteronomy 15, where it was perfectly legitimate to keep an Israelite as a slave, this is no longer allowed in Leviticus 25.

If Israelites can no longer purchase fellow Israelites as slaves, a natural question arises in this context: where should they get slaves? We get our answer in the verses that follow:

“Your male and female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you and members of their clan born in your country, and they will become your property. You can bequeath them to your children as inherited property and can make them slaves for life, but you must not rule over your fellow Israelites ruthlessly” (Leviticus 25:44–46).

Among other things, we learn from these verses that:

1. Chattel slaves can be purchased from the foreigners living in the nations around Israel and from foreign tenant farmers living in Israel.

2. These slaves become their property.

3. The property can be passed on as an inheritance to their children.

4. They could be made to serve as slaves for life.

In short, the Israelites were given special treatment as God’s slaves, because they already had a master: God himself. They could not be treated as slaves by another master; instead, they were to be treated as hired workers, whether under the control of an Israelite or foreign master. In contrast to this, foreign slaves were able to be purchased, kept as property, passed on as inheritance, and made to serve for life.

The New Testament

While theological interpretations are not the focus of my investigation into the Hebrew Bible, I have found that addressing certain arguments made by apologists can open up the dialogue in a meaningful way. In light of this, I would like to address an interpretation that, while certainly not new, has resurfaced with some frequency.

This apologetic argument admits that the Old Testament endorsed slavery. However, it argues that this was God’s way of slowly developing the morality of humanity, beginning with his chosen people. In other words, God allowed slavery in the Old Testament but was all the while slowly working to reveal to humanity that it was immoral. In the Bible as a whole, there are a few pieces of evidence that are cited in this regard.

First, and certainly foremost, is Matthew 19:3–9, where Jesus was tested on the subject of divorce. We do not need to go into great detail in this passage, as the basic principle that is used to support the argument is relatively clear. Jesus is confronted with a portion of the Mosaic law, Deuteronomy 24:1–4, which seems to contradict what Jesus had just taught. Jesus responded that Moses had legally permitted men to divorce their wives because their hearts were hard (Matthew 19:8). This was not God’s intent from the beginning. In other words, in the beginning, God created man and woman to be united for all time. He later allowed for divorce because of the sinfulness of mankind.

This passage is then abstracted and applied to slavery. It is argued that Jesus and the New Testament were attempting to bring humanity out of slavery. While slavery is not mentioned in the text, the principle of returning to creation can be similarly applied. Immediately following creation, before the fall, people were not enslaved to one another but rather lived with one another with equality. It was only later, when mankind became sinful and wicked, that God had to regulate their behavior in an attempt to bring them back to the pristine state of creation.

In order to effectively demonstrate that Jesus intended to bring about the abolishment of slavery, or even to draw attention to its immoral character, it would seem likely that two things would need to be present in the text or in history. First, Jesus and other New Testament authors would have condemned the practice in some overt way. Second, the early church would have recognized such condemnation. Is this what we see?

In order to demonstrate that Jesus and the writers of the New Testament spoke out against or condemned slavery, there are several common passages that are cited by apologists. Setting aside general statements about loving one another, Paul’s letter to Philemon often appears early in the conversation. Here, it is argued, the Apostle implores Philemon to free his slave, Onesimus, upon his return. Although the meaning of the book is debated, assuming the interpretation most in favor of an anti-slavery position by the Apostle, Onesimus would indeed have been a slave of Philemon whom Paul was seeking to have freed.

Another text that is frequently cited comes from the so-called Pastoral Epistles. In 1 Timothy 1:9–10, the writer is speaking on the purpose of the law, listing those for whom it was made:

“We also know that the law is made not for the righteous but for lawbreakers and rebels, the ungodly and sinful, the unholy and irreligious, for those who kill their fathers or mothers, for murderers, for the sexually immoral, for those practicing homosexuality, for slave traders and liars and perjurers, and for whatever else is contrary to sound doctrine.”

In verse 10, the inclusion of “slave traders” in a list of immoral practices is used to support the New Testament’s anti-slavery position. The next verse that is cited in this regard is Galatians 3:28, where Paul writes, “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”

New Testament scholar Hans Dieter Betz summarizes the two ways in which this verse can be understood with respect to slavery: “Taken alone, the statement can be understood in two ways: as a declaration of the abolishment of the social institution of slavery, or as a declaration of the irrelevancy of that institution, which would indicate the possibility of its retainment.”

If the former position is taken, then one could argue that Jesus came to do away with the social institution of slavery. Let us begin with Galatians 3:28. We remember that there are two ways of interpreting the phrase “neither slave nor free.” Number one is abolishing the institution of slavery, or number two, showing it to be irrelevant. Betz notes the overwhelming evidence in early and later Christianity seems to recommend only the second option as viable, a view taken by most commentators: that the passage is not intended to do away with the social institution of slavery is clear for several reasons.

First, the other two statements in the verse—”neither Jew nor Gentile” and especially “neither male nor female”—can hardly be understood as doing away with such distinctions. Whatever one would argue concerning the attitude of the New Testament writers on the role and status of women—another topic entirely—it would be difficult to maintain that passages like 1 Corinthians 14:34–35 would allow the social distinction between men and women to be ignored.

The point of Galatians 3:28, it would seem, is to express the unity that members of the body of Christ share by being in Christ. New Testament scholar Scot McKnight writes, “To be in Christ is to be in spiritual fellowship with him through God’s spirit. This is one way of defining what a Christian is: one who is in Christ. Although believers are now all united and equal in the eyes of God, having been baptized into Christ, this does not negate the reality of social and role distinctions between members.”

Regarding the reference to social groups, including slaves, ancient Near Eastern scholar Hector Avalos concludes: “Galatians 3:28 was clearly meant solely to establish the reckoning of believers as Abraham’s seed, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or slave status.” Other New Testament authors certainly did not see this passage as incompatible with having Christian slaves or ordering Christian slaves to serve their slave masters (Ephesians 5:24 or 6:5).

When we consider 1 Timothy 1:10, where slave traders are included in the list of vices, it may seem straightforward that this shows that the writer condemned slavery. This is simply not the case. Concerning these slave traders, professor of religious studies J. Albert Harrill describes them in this way: “Slave dealers displayed vice at every stage of the slave-trading operation, from the illegitimate acquisition and the deceptive selling of merchandise to the polluting result such sale had on places and people. In acquiring merchandise, when legitimate sources such as war captives did not offer enough supply, they were not above kidnapping free citizens—a criminal act against the law of nations.”

In fact, this word for “slave trader” appears in other so-called vice lists outside of the New Testament, clearly demonstrating that the act of stealing or illegally procuring another individual was not only considered immoral in the New and Old Testaments but also among the other nations. Avalos notes: “The fact that slave societies of Greece and Rome condemned andrapodistai (slave traders) indicates that pure slave trading cannot be meant.”

Harrill concurs: “Rather than revealing some alleged early Christian condemnation of slavery or the slave trade, the language of 1 Timothy articulates attitudes commonplace among masters in the Roman Empire. The term andrapodistai was derogatory only in the sense of the slaveholders’ exploitation—economic and sexual—of free citizens and of their proverbial abuse of the law.” The ancient world believed in the moral goodness of slavery yet condemned the immorality of slave traders.

Finally, let us examine the book of Philemon. As we discussed before, apologists often turn to Philemon as a perhaps subtle statement on the position of Christianity on slavery. However, one understands the situation being described in the book, we would be hard-pressed to see it as presenting an overarching declaration on the institution of slavery. New Testament scholar Edward Lohse writes concerning this view: “For good reasons, this view has found no acceptance, and today is no longer held by anyone. The letter to Philemon is neither the disguise of a general idea nor the promulgation of a generally valid rule about the question of slavery.”

Assuming that a slave-master relationship existed between Philemon and Onesimus, it seems clear that Paul leaves the decision to free Onesimus to Philemon. In verses 8 through 9, for example, Paul writes: “Therefore, although in Christ I could be bold and order you to do what you ought to do, yet I prefer to appeal to you on the basis of love.”

Lohse comments: “It is the intercession of the Apostle in a concrete situation in which love (agape) must be promoted by decision and deed.” This lack of a direct command based on the immoral character of the act of enslavement is indeed problematic in the context. In other words, if we were to see a passage like 1 Timothy 1:10 as a direct indictment against the practice of slavery, it is incredibly difficult to imagine a scenario in which Paul would say, “I’m leaving this up to you; I don’t want to force you to set him free.”

Hector Avalos says it this way: “Nowhere in the letter do we see Paul saying, ‘Slavery is a sin, and you must free Onesimus.’ Nowhere in the letter do we have anything even akin to the strong directive issued by Paul on such things as drunkenness and adultery (1 Corinthians 6:8–9), incest (1 Corinthians 5), or just not working hard enough (2 Thessalonians 2:10).” At best, it would seem the book of Philemon is evidence of Paul encouraging Philemon to forgive and free his runaway slave in order that Onesimus might return to Paul to help him in the ministry. In no way is this a broad directive against owning other human beings as slaves.

The Antebellum South

At this point, you might be thinking: “Okay, so the Old Testament laws seem to have endorsed slavery, and the New Testament did not seem to condemn the practice, but it still wasn’t like slavery in the American South.” The problem with this type of comparison is that it is generally made between the laws of the Old Testament and what actually took place in the Antebellum South. There is usually not a comparison made between the laws of the Old Testament and the laws in the American South.

When we view the laws in the South, we actually find that there are many similarities between the two sets of laws. Let us take a look at two examples of laws from the Antebellum South to see how they compare to those in the Old Testament. Again, for a much more detailed discussion with this issue, see Dr. Joshua Bowen’s book, Did the Old Testament Endorse Slavery? (Second Edition).

We will jump to the period leading up to the Civil War. There was a significant development, relatively speaking, in the humanity of the legal system after the Revolutionary War. First, the African slave trade was ended by the beginning of the 19th century. While it was not illegal to have slaves, it was illegal to import them via the slave trade. The process was begun during the war by imposing heavy taxes on the purchase of slaves from Africa. Finkelman notes that South Carolina sought to re-establish the African slave trade; this was shortly ended.

The treatment of slaves was also improved throughout the South during this period. Law professor Paul Finkelman writes: “In most of the post-revolutionary South, the laws became more humane as Southern states prohibited their more barbaric punishments such as dismemberment. North Carolina criminalized the murder of a slave in 1791, but South Carolina did not do so until 1821. Most other slave states adopted similar rules, either by statute or through common law decisions in the Antebellum Period.”

For example, in Georgia’s constitution in 1798, section 12, we read:

“Any person who shall maliciously dismember or deprive a slave of life shall suffer such punishment as would be inflicted in case the like offense had been committed on a free white person, and on the like proof, except in case of insurrection by such slave, and unless such death should happen by accident in giving such slave moderate correction.”

Thus, if it was determined that a slave master had abused their slave to the point of dismemberment or death, the penalty would be equal to the penalty for murdering a free white person. Nevertheless, let us not forget the end of the law: “unless such death should happen by accident in giving such slave moderate correction.” The tension remained in the eyes of the lawmakers: masters must be allowed to beat their slaves for the purposes of correction. However far the law was progressing in an attempt to protect slaves from abuse, it seemed to always run up against the problem of corporal punishment for correction.

A similar law was adopted in North Carolina in 1791, outlawing the deliberate homicide of a slave. The earlier law of 1774 had made it so that the killing of a slave, however wanton, cruel, and deliberate, was only punishable in the first instance by imprisonment and paying the value thereof to the owner. However, this act sought to rectify what was considered highly inappropriate, which distinction of criminality between the murder of a white person and of one who is equally an human creature but merely of a different complexion is disgraceful to humanity and degrading in the highest degree to the laws and principles of a free society.

The legislative evolution of the Antebellum period, while often highlighted as a move toward greater morality, reveals the inherent difficulty of regulating the institution of human chattel slavery. The central conflict was between the recognition of the slave as a human being worthy of legal protections against wanton murder, and the fundamental definition of the slave as property that must be subject to the master’s “moderate” correction.

This mirrors the legislative tension we observed in the ancient codes. When the law defines a person as property—as both the Mosaic code and the Southern statutes did—the protection of that individual becomes fundamentally paradoxical. How can one fully protect the life and bodily integrity of a person who is, by definition, an asset to be utilized for the benefit of another?

In the Old Testament, the “moderate” correction permitted for a child or a slave was seen as a paternalistic right of the head of the household. If the slave survived the beating for a day or two, the master was exonerated, because the intent was not deemed murderous. Similarly, the Southern courts struggled with the line between “moderate” correction and criminal assault.

The comparison between these two systems—the ancient Hebrew and the American Antebellum—challenges the perception that legal progressivism is purely a linear journey. Instead, it highlights that when laws operate within the paradigm of human ownership, they are constrained by the very institution they attempt to regulate. The legal frameworks in both contexts were not merely reflections of their time; they were attempts to balance the harsh realities of slavery with the evolving moral sensitivities of the societies that practiced it.

Furthermore, the economic necessity of slavery in both the ancient Near East and the American South created strong incentives for maintaining the status quo. The ability to bequeath property, the right to purchase human labor, and the social stratification that slavery produced were integral to the economic health of these societies.

When we read the biblical texts through this lens, we see them not as abstract moral guides that are detached from the reality of their economic environment, but as ancient legal documents that codified the social structures of the time. They provided a framework for living within a system that accepted the ownership of human beings as a foundational pillar.

This acknowledgment does not necessarily invalidate the ethical messages found elsewhere in the Bible, but it does necessitate a more nuanced understanding of how religious texts interact with human institutions. It asks us to confront the fact that ancient societies, including those presented in the biblical narrative, were capable of formulating highly sophisticated legal codes while simultaneously maintaining practices that we today recognize as profoundly dehumanizing.

Ultimately, the study of slavery in the Bible and in the American South serves as a cautionary tale about the power of legal systems to justify human inequality. By defining the “other” as property, societies have historically created a blind spot in their moral and legal reasoning, allowing for the justification of actions that would be condemned if applied to those considered “like us.”

The persistent debate over whether the Bible “endorses” or “condemns” slavery often hinges on whether we are looking for a blanket moral statement or examining the actual, concrete legal realities that the text describes. As we have seen, the text provides both protections for slaves and mechanisms for their permanent ownership. This complexity is not a defect to be smoothed over, but a reflection of the reality of ancient life—a world where slavery was not a theoretical anomaly but a deeply embedded social and economic institution that was regulated, maintained, and inherited across generations.

By engaging with the text in this way, we are better equipped to understand not only the world of the ancient Near East but also the ways in which human systems—including our own—can harbor deep contradictions between our ideals and our practices. Understanding the history of these laws, and the contexts in which they were applied, allows us to grapple with the past with the honesty and critical awareness that it deserves.

This brings us back to the core of the discussion. Whether we are discussing the ancient codes of Mesopotamia, the laws of the Hebrew Bible, or the statutes of the American South, we are dealing with a common human history: a history of power, property, and the attempt to codify the treatment of human beings who have been placed at the bottom of the social hierarchy. It is a history that is often uncomfortable, but it is one that is essential to study if we are to understand the development of our own moral and ethical landscapes.

Through the lens of scholarly research, we can move beyond the surface-level debates and look at the structural, legal, and economic realities that have defined slavery throughout human history. This approach provides a clearer picture of how and why these systems functioned, how they were defended, and how they eventually faced challenges that forced them to change. It reminds us that our own definitions of human rights and dignity are the product of a long, difficult, and ongoing struggle—a struggle that requires us to be as honest as possible about the history that brought us here.

In conclusion, the presence of slavery in the Hebrew Bible is a stark reminder of the cultural and moral distance that can exist between the modern world and the ancient world. It challenges us to hold our reverence for the past alongside a commitment to our own ethical standards. By continuing to investigate these topics with rigor and curiosity, we ensure that we are not simply repeating the narratives of the past, but are actively engaging with the difficult lessons they have to offer.

The story of humanity is one of constant evolution, and the history of slavery is a crucial chapter in that ongoing, complex, and profound narrative. As we continue to study and reflect upon these ancient laws, we are better prepared to address the questions of justice, equality, and human worth that remain as pressing today as they ever were. The legacy of these texts is not just in their words, but in the questions they provoke us to ask about ourselves, our society, and our shared future.